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SUMMARY PROCEDURE FOR FORECLOSURE
OF TAXES IN NORTH CAROLINA
PEYTON B. ABBoTTt
INTRODUCTION
No one contends that the laws and decisions governing the fore-
closure of taxes and special assessments are divinely inspired. But
those laws and decisions are somewhat like the Holy Scriptures in that
almost any point may be proven by quoting isolated sections or even
entire decisions. The books are full of inconsistencies, some apparent,
some real. Some apparently inconsistent court decisions arise from
changes in the statutes, and unless these changes are carefully traced,
the decisions seem at odds with each other whereas they are merely
reflecting statutory changes. But there are also a number of real in-
consistencies, some of which are of a fundamental nature. For ex-
ample, in Orange County v. Jenkins,' an action to foreclose the lien
of taxes was regarded as a proceeding in rem; in Charlotte v. Kav-
anaugh,2 one distinction drawn between actions to foreclose special
assessments and proceedings on taxes is that the former are in rem only,
while the latter may seek personal judgments. And separated by no
longer period of time than two years are the following pronouncements
with regard to the necessity of serving summons upon all interested
parties: (1) "To require the sheriff, purchaser, or holder of a certificate
to search the records of the courts to ascertain the names of all who
have a lien or claim an interest in the subject matter of the sale would
amount to an imposition of a burden not within the scope or contem-
plation of the statutes regulating the sale of land for taxes."8  (2) "It
is so easy in proceedings of this kind to make all who have an interest
in the land parties to the controversy." 4
The moral seems to be that the tax attorney should give full and
ample publicity as to his intentions, personally serving, if possible, all
interested persons, whether sane or insane, adult or minor, in esse or,
in ventre sa mere, known or unknown, resident or non-resident, live
corporations or dissolved ones. Failing in personal service, the pro-
visions relating to substituted service should be followed to the letter.
In instituting foreclosure proceedings upon tax and assessment liens,
t LL.B., 1931, University of North Carolina Law School. Assistant Director,
Institute of Government, the University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill, N. C.1200 N. C. 202, 156 S. E. 774 (1930).
1221 N. C. 259, 20 S. E. (2d) 97 (1942).
Orange County v. Wilson, 202 N. C. 424, 428, 163 S. E. 113, 115 (1932).
'Buncombe County v. Penland, 206 N. C. 299, 306, 173 S. E. 609, 613 (1934).
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the attorney has two principal objectives: (1) To get the money.
(2) To see that the taxing unit will obtain a marketable title in the
event the proceeding must be carried through. If the money is collected
and non-suit is entered, irregularities become immaterial. But if the
taxing unit must finally take a deed, whether judgment was by default
or after a contest by some defendant, irregularities may result in a
great loss to the taxing unit. Thousands of tax titles have been re-
jected by attorneys in North Carolina within the past few years for
such reasons as the failure to bring in necessary parties, as judgment
creditors, mortgagees or unknown heirs, or for the failure to have orders
signed on proper days, or to prevent a discontinuance by failing to
issue proper and timely alias and pluries summonses.
One city alone found itself with several hundred parcels of real
estate on hand with a large percentage of the titles unmarketable. Some
of the titles were materially defective while many others were good or
had only minor, correctible defects. But because of the bad ones and
because of the uncertainties of the law, the public had generally become
afraid of any tax title. Because of the many technicalities involved in
examining a tax title and because so many defects were discovered
which the title attorneys had to see properly corrected if possible, at-
torneys charged larger fees for examing tax titles than any others, thus
tending to further discourage prospective purchasers. Finally the city,
more as a psychological move than as a practical measure, resorted to
Torrenizing the titles-a procedure much more expensive than the
original foreclosure. And in the meantime the city was not only losing
its own taxes upon the foreclosed property, but was having to pay
county taxes on it as well!
This well illustrates the proposition that the only safe course is to
meet the maximum requirements of the law, rather than searching for
the minimum, until the law is much better settled than at present.
Title attorneys can usually be depended upon to require every "i" to be
dotted, every "t" to be crossed, when examining a tax title. Unless
the foreclosed property can be sold or profitably used by the taxing
unit, the foreclosure proceeding is worse than 'useless.
The Machinery Act gives the tax attorney the option of proceeding
to foreclose taxes by any one of three methods: (1) A summary pro-
ceeding under Section 1720 of the Machinery Act.5 (2) A proceeding
under Section 1719 of the Machinery Act.6 (3) A proceeding in the
nature of an action to foreclose a mortgage, under C. S. 7990.7 Since
this work is mainly concerned with summary proceedings a detailed
N. C. CODE AxNr. (Michie, 1939) §7971(229).8 Id. §7971(228). 7Id. §7990.
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discussion of the two latter proceedings will not be undertaken. How-
ever, a brief comment on them seems appropriate.
Although there is no practical difference either as to costs or results
in foreclosures instituted under C. S. 7990 and those instituted under
the Machinery Act, it seems that as to taxes for 1937 and prior years
it would be safer to proceed under C. S. 1790 and thereby avoid any
question as to the statute of limitationss* In foreclosing 1938 and later
taxes, the procedure under the Machinery Act would seem to be prefer-
able since it (1) eliminates any question as to the rate of interest to be
charged, (2) allows the attorney one year rather than 90 days in which
to issue his alias summons or begin service by publication, and (3) pro-
vides in one place in chronological order an outline of the procedural
steps in foreclosure proceedings against which title attorneys can check
in future years and perhaps persuade themselves a little more readily
that the tax title is good. The preceding comments are likewise
applicable to actions to foreclose special assessments except that there
are other considerations with respect to the statute of limitations that
should be taken into account.9 *
SummARY PROCEDURE UNDER SEcTION 1720
In its session of 1939, the General Assembly in response to appeals
for an inexpensive and simplified method for enforcing the payment
of taxes by subjecting real estate to sale, enacted Section 1720 of the
Machinery Act.
The need for such a simplified procedure was real. The need for
a -direct affirmance of the validity of such procedure is real. For ex-
ample, take a lot or tract worth on the market about $800. Assume
that it will be listed on the tax book at a valuation of $500. With a
tax rate of $1, the tax will be $5. In order to begin to enforce pay-
ment through a formal court action of foreclosure, the attorney must
spend at least $10 worth of time examining the title to the property.
He must spend at least $10 more of time in attending to the various
steps in the procedure and in seeing that ill necessary parties are
brought in by personal service or by publication, seeing that all tech-
nicalities are observed. And he must incur at least $10 worth of costs,
fees, etc., in order to carry the proceeding to a conclusion-all to collect
'*There is no statute of limitations applicable to either action, but actions
under the Machinery Act may not be instituted earlier than six months after the
sale of the tax lien. Actions under C. S. 7990 may be begun at any time after
the tax or assessment becomes due-the first Monday in October of the year in
which the tax is assessed, as to taxes, and usually the same date as to assessment
installments.
'* For a thorough discussion on the collection of special assessments, see Ab-
bott, The Collectibility of Special Assessments More Than Ten Years Delinqucnl
(1944) 22 N. C. L. REv. 120.
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$5. So the tax on that property must be allowed to become from six
to ten years delinquent before it becomes economically profitable to
even attempt to enforce collection. Take a thousand such cases, and
you have from $30,000 to $50,000 that must be allowed to become and
remain delinquent because it is not economically profitable to enforce
collection. And all the time there is property almost within walking
distance out of which the tax should be readily collectible! Govern-
ment imposes no such burden upon private business. Business would
demand and receive .procedures more suited to its needs, and the courts
would recognize that in the case, of business, "justice delayed is justice
denied." For example, if landlords still had to resort to the old com-
mon law writ of ejectment in order to dispossess a tenant, they could
easily lose an entire year's rent before they could get rid of a non-paying
tenant; so they were given a summary ejectment procedure. Other ex-
amples of summary remedies afforded private business will be mentiond
later.
Why should taxing units, exercising sovereign powers, be forced
into the use of methods more cumbersome than is required of private
parties who have a much weaker claim of right to summary remedies?
Is the difference founded upon the necessity of guarding against abuse
and oppression? The constitutional requirements of uniformity and
equitable administration of the taxing power impose safeguards not
found to such a degree with respect to individual action. It is much
easier for private parties to resort to arbitrary, oppressive and discrim-
inatory action than for governmental units to do so. Whatever the
tax law may be, it must be applied uniformly to all persons in the same
situation, and all must be fed out of the same spoon. The office
holder who resorts to capricious or oppressive measures, who misuses
his power, who singles out individuals for harsh or unwarranted treat-
ment can be and usually is voted out of office. Not so with officers of
private corporations or private individuals who, as an aid to the con-
duct of their businesses, are given efficient and simple remedies. They
are "within the law" if they violate no criminal statute. They can
and often do personally profit .by taking advantage of others through
some short-cut afforded them by law. Public officers may not profit
personally from such action, and therefore have less incentive to mis-
use their power. It would seem that governmental units ought to be
trusted at least as much as private parties in the use of summary
remedies.
The mischief created by the imposition of unduly elaborate and
exacting tax procedures is two-fold: (1) an unnecessary burden of
expense and delay is placed upon the taxing unit; therefore upon the
taxpayer, both individually and collectively. (2) The complicated pro-
1944]
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cedure now followed affords innumerable opportunities for minor errors,
causing titles to be subject to "technical defects," raising doubts in the
minds of prospective purchasers as to the validity of any tax title, all
of which results in the serious impairment of the marketability of
property necessarily acquired through foreclosure, thus adding heavily
to the burden of the taxing unit and hence to the burden of the
taxpayer.
"Hard cases make bad law." Many hard cases have made much
bad tax law. In an understandable and human 'desire to help a par-
ticular taxpayer hold on to his property-a taxpayer who has been less
vigilant than the court in protecting his interests-the courts have
gradually extended the requirements necessary to technically perfect a
tax title, with the result that the burden of government is increased
and must be paid for by thousands of taxpayers who know that taxes
fall due year after year and that foreclosures may be instituted if the
taxes are not paid, and who have been alert to protect their own in-
terests. Why should this situation exist? Why should not the maxim
zvgilantibus et non dormientibus subvenit lex apply as well to taxation
as to commercial transactions?
In Section 1720 of the Machinery Act the legislature has provided
a simple, inexpensive method for the sale of real estate for taxes which
has its equivalent in a number of procedures in use for the enforce-
ment of individual rights-procedures which result in the transfer of
titles which go blithely into the channels of commerce unstigmatized
by any whisperings of illegitimacy.
OUTLINE OF PROCEDURE UNDER SECTION 1720
1. Notice to the Taxpayer
The first step in a proceeding under Section 1720 consists of mail-
ing to the listing taxpayer, at his last known address, by registered
mail, a letter stating that a judgment will be docketed against him and
that execution will be issued thereon as provided by law. The letter
must be mailed at least two weeks before docketing the judgment, and
must be sent by registered mail. The section states that the receipt
of the letter by the taxpayer, or receipt of actual notice by the taxpayer
or by any interested party shall not be required for the validity or
priority of the judgment or of the title acquired by the purchaser at
the execution sale.
Proof of the mailing of the letter, if it should become necessary,
would be facilitated by the retention of a carbon copy of the letter,
together with the registry receipt, in the files of the collector or attorney.
[Vol. 22
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2. Filing Certificate of Taxes Due
The second step in the procedure is to file with the Clerk of the
Superior Court a certificate showing the tax due. This certificate must
show the name of the listing taxpayer, the amount of taxes, interest,
penalties and costs, the year for which the tax is due, and a description
of the real estate upon which the tax is a lien. The description of the
real estate must be sufficient to permit its identification by parol
testimony.
Other than the above requirements, no form of the certificate or
judgment is set out. Since the certificate is to be docketed by the
Clerk as a judgment, and since the section requires that a separate tax
judgment docket be kept for each year's taxes, it would seem to be
practical for the collector or attorney to make up the tax judgment
docket himself, in a form approved by the Clerk of Court, and deliver
the docket to the clerk who would endorse on each certificate therein
the fact and date of filing and docketing, and fill in his fee (50c) for
docketing and indexing the judgment. The judgment docket sheets
could be printed with four or more certificate forms to the page, leav-
ing the reverse side, which would be the facing page for the preceding
sheet, blank but. ruled to conform to the upper and lower edges of each
certificate for the entry of assignments or cancellations. Each certif-
icate should be signed by the collector, either personally or by a rubber
stamp facsimile signature. Since Section 1722 authorizes a rubber
stamp facsimile signature but no other, a facsimile printed on the
forms might be questioned.
3. Issuance of Execution
At any time after six months from the indexing (not docketing) of
the judgment, and before the expiration of two years from such
indexing, the governing body may request the Clerk of Court to issue
execution. Execution is issued in the same manner and form as other
executions against specific property are issued 'in the Superior Court,
and the sheriff is required to sell the property therein described in the
same manner as in other execution sales, except that no homestead
exemptions are allowed. The Act provides that in lieu of personal
service of notice upon the owner of the property, notice by registered
mail may be sent to the listing taxpayer at his last known address at
least one week prior to the date fixed for the sale. It is not stated
whether this duty should be performed by the sheriff or by the tax col-
lector. It probably should be done by the collector, but in any event
the collector should make certain that the notice is mailed. While the
Act says such mailed notice is "in lieu of" personal service, it also
1944]
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says such notice "shall be mailed"; so that it would be safer to mail
the notice as required even where personal service is obtained.
DOWER RIGHTS
While the Act is silent as to dower rights, by inference such rights
are cut off by the execution sale, as the Act provides that the purchaser
at the execution sale "shall acquire title to said property free and clear
of all claims, rights, interest and liens except the lien of other taxes
and assessments not paid from the purchase price and not included in
the judgment." Although it is not required, it would probably be pru-
dent to include the listing taxpayer's wife in the notices and in the
judgment, and thus obviate the. question of dower arising later. This
action is especially indicated in view of the fact that the wife's dlower
interest is being subjected to sale to satisfy taxes assessed against per-
sonal property in which she may have no interest.
WHERE ONE OTHER THAN THE OWNER LISTS THE PROPERTY
The Act does not provide for any notification to the record owner
of the property where it is listed in the name of one other than such
owner, and it is probable that the notices to the one who listed the
property and a judgment certificate drawn against the one who listed
the property would be sufficient. The Court stated in Forsyth County
V. Joyce,'0 in which the property was listed by one other than the
owner, that an action instituted against the tax lister would have been
maintainable without making the true owner a party, if the property
was sufficiently described, unless the true owner had listed it and paid
taxes on it. However, it would undoubtedly be better and render a
title more readily marketable if the records were checked at least to
the extent of seeing that the property was listed in the name of the
record owner. If listed by someone other than the record owner, it
would be prudent to send the notices to the record owner as well as to
the tax lister, and to include the record owner and spouse in the judg-
ment certificate.
CONSOLIDATION OF LIENS
By agreement, two or more taxing units may consolidate their liens
for the purpose of docketing judgment, and they may also include two
or more judgments against the same property in one execution." If,
after docketing a judgment, another taxing unit institutes a foreclosure
action against the same taxpayer with respect to taxes upon the same
property and makes the tax judgment creditor a party, such tax judg-
ment creditor should file an answer and set up its tax lien claim in the
10204 N. C. 734, 169 S. E. 655 (1933).
I N. C. CODE ANN. (Michie, 1939) §7971(229) (e).
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action. The action then proceeds as if the tax judgment had not been
docketed. The Act doesn't say so, but it would probably be well, upon
judgment being rendered in the foreclosure action, to make ag entry
upon the tax judgment docket to the following effect: "The lien for
taxes upon which this judgment is based has been included in a judg-
ment entered in an action entitled '.-........................... vs -. .....................2
which judgment is recorded in Judgment Docket --------, Page ---........--
and this tax judgment is accordingly cancelled."
NOTICE AND ADVERTISEMENT OF SALE
As heretofore stated, the execution sale is to be conducted in the
same manner as other execution sales, with the exception of registered
mail notice to the listing taxpayer at least one week prior to the date
set for the sale, in lieu of personal service upon the owner.12 There
is this further difference; the sheriff may, and at the request of the
taxing unit must, include more than one execution in the same notice
and advertisement of sale.13 The execution should direct the sheriff
to sell the property which is described in the judgment, and the notices
and advertisement should describe the property sufficiently to permit
its identification by parol testimony.
If two or more executions are included in the same advertisement,
the property described ih each judgment should be separately set out,
and the name of each listing taxpayer should be set out in connection
with each parcel.
LIMITATIONS UNDER SECTION 1720
Judgment may be docketed under Section 1720 at any time after
six months from the sale of the tax certificates, and within two years
after such sale. If the principal amount of the tax is $5 or less, the
judgment may be docketed at any time within four years of the certif-
icate sale (but after the six months waiting period has expired). Since
the section does not provide for including taxes for two or more years
in the same judgment, and since it does provide for a separate judg-
ment docket for each year, the extra two years allowed for docketing
small items is apparently designed only to allow that much longer time
to attempt collection by other methods. Since the execution cannot
issue until after six months from the date judgment is indexed, and
must be issued within two years of such date, some economy can be
effected with respect to small tax items by holding off the docketing
as long as possible, then docket for several years at once (three years
would ordinarily be the limit) and issue one execution upon all of the
judgments.
'2 Id. §7971 (229) (c). "3 Id. §7971(229) (e).
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SPECIAL ASSESSMENTS
Any special assessments due a taxing unit may be included in a tax
judgment, or a separate judgment for special assessments may be dock-
eted under the provisions of Section 1720.
It is not too clear as to what limitations may apply to proceedings
upon special assessments under the section. Subsection (f), which
makes the only mention in the section as to special assessments, is silent
on the matter. The limitation as to taxes has reference to the sales
date of the certificates, and the lien of special assessment installments
are not necessarily sold. Then there is C. S. 2717(a), which provides
that "no statute of limitation, whether fixed by law specially referred
to in this chapter or otherwise" shall bar the right to enforce any rem-
edy for special assessments until ten years after default.14* That statute
hasn't been repealed, but the Machinery Act, passed ten years later,
provides a new remedy and a new statute of limitations. If the new
remedy is elected, the court would probably hold that the limitations
attached to it would be applicable.1 5 In instances where no assessment
lien sales are held, it is probable that the statute would start running
on the due date of the installment. Unless, upon default of one install-
ment the remaining installments are declared due and collectible under
C. S. 2716, it doesn't seem that Section 1720 affords a very convenient
method of handling special assessments, for the short period of limita-
tions allowed for taking the initial step and then for issuing execution
puts collection upon a piece-meal basis.
VALIDITY OF TITLE ACQUIRED UNDER SECTION 1720
Although Section 1720 has been available as a method for enforcing
collection of taxes for five years, the Supreme Court has not passed
upon the validity of titles that may be acquired under that procedure.
The method is in use, and reports are to the effect that it provides an
effective means of keeping fairly well up-to-date those relatively small
amounts of taxes individually, but large in the aggregate, which hardly
justify the expense involved in a court action. It is particularly effec-
tive as an aid to the regular collection of taxes upon vacant lots and
small pieces of property which are usually permitted to remain delin-
quent from year to year until the aggregate tax becomes such that the
taxing unit finds it has purchased a piece of property on the installment
plan. The effectiveness of the remedy is in spite of a widespread but
rarely defined feeling among tax attorneys that the titles thus acquired
are invalid.
"'* This statute and its possible effect is extensively discussed in the article
cited in note 9, supra.
" Wilkes County v. Forester, 204 N. C. 163, 167 S. E. 691 (1933).
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What is wrong with a title acquired through this summary pro-
cedure? The principal suggestion is that the procedure fails to observe
the requirements of due. process of law. And what is due process of
law? Our Court has stated many times that notice and an opportunity
to be heard fulfills the requirements of due process. An actual hearing
is not required, but rather an opportunity to be heard. What kind of
notice? To whom must it be given?
PROCEEDINGS IN REM AND ACTIONS IN PERSONAM
Section 1720 designates the procedure thereunder as an in rem pro-
ceeding, and it is in fact such a proceeding. The theory and purpose
of the section is well stated by the legislature:
"It is hereby expressly declared to be the intention of this section that
proceedings brought under it shall be strictly in rem. It is further
declared to be the intention of the section to provide a simple and in-
expensive method of enforcing the payment of taxes necessarily levied,
to the knowledge of all, for the requirements of local governments in this
State; and to recognize, in authorizing such proceeding, that all those
owning interests in real property know, or should know, without spe-
cial notice thereof, that such property may be seized and sold for failure
to pay such lawful taxes."
The subject matter of the proceeding is the property itself. The object
of the proceeding is the enforcement of a lawful lien thereon-a lien
which everyone knows must be satisfied and which is also a matter of
record. Personal notice has never been thought necessary in such pro-
ceedings. The Act of the Court in taking possession of the property
in such proceedings has always been considered to be sufficient notice
to interested parties. The practice in admiralty cases is a good ex-
ample. The seizure by the Court serves as notice to interested parties
and to give the Court jurisdiction. After the property is seized, the
subsequent proceeding is for the purpose of determining the amount of
the lien and for the formal entry of the order of sale. In tax cases, the
amount of the lien has already been determined.
TAxEs ALREADY ADJUDICATED
Sometimes lost sight of is the fact that a tax is not a claim merely,
or a chose in action, or a circumstance that gives rise to a right of
action. A tax is the result of an action. There has already been an
adjudication in a quasi-judicial proceeding of which everyone is charged
with notice, and the tax, when lawfully assessed and levied, is -a judg-
ment. The amount of the judgment is fixed by the assessing and levy-
ing procedure, and the incidents of the judgment are fixed by law.
Among other things, the law makes it a specific and prior lien upon
1944]
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the property taxed. That is no more than the admiralty court does
with respect to claims for salvage. The theory of the admiralty law is
that without the salvage operations, the ship may have been lost, and
therefore the work benefited all interested parties and the claim for
such services should have priority over pre-existing liens. The fact that
the sale of the ship may cut off those liens as effectively as if the ship
had been allowed to sink appears not to alter the theory. As to taxes,
if government cannot enforce its own support, very little value will be
left in any property. Even the man whose lien is superseded and cut
off by a tax sale receives an indirect benefit through the continued
operation of government.
The amount of the: tax lien has been adjudicated, and upon that
matter the taxpayer has had his opportunity for a hearing. If he did
not agree with the valuation at which his property was assessed, he
had an opportunity to protest, and to appear before the county board
of equalization. From the ruling of that board he could appeal to the
State Board of Assessment, from there to the Superior Court and from
there to the Supreme Court. It certainly can't be said that there has
been a want of due process so far as the owner is concerned. To so
hold would invalidate all tax levies. The tax having been regularly
assessed and levied, and having been given the force and effect of a
judgment and execution thereon in the hands of the collector (Section
1103),16 there would appear to be no fundamental or constitutional
requirement for giving further notice before docketing the tax judg-
ment in the collector's hands as a judgment of the Superior Court. It
amounts to no more than transcribing a judgment of a justice of the
peace and docketing the transcript as a Superior Court judgment. No
one contends that the defendant in the magistrate's court or any one
else must be given notice of such action. It is the purpose of the judg-
ment to give notice to the world of the adjudication therein contained
and of the legal rights that flow therefrom.
NOTICE TO OTHER INTERESTED PARTIES
Why should interested parties other than the owner of the property
be given special notice of the docketing of a judgment for duly assessed
taxes, or of the issuance of execution thereon? They are not accorded
this special attention in the case of ordinary litigation. For example,
John Doe sues Richard Roe on a note for an amount within the juris-
diction of a magistrate. He gives Roe legal notice by causing sum-
mons to be served upon him, but he is not required to give notice to
anyone else. Roe may but doesn't have to appear just as the taxpayer
may or may not appear before the board of equalization. After the
' N. C. CODE ANt. (Michie, 1939) §7971(158).
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magistrate renders judgment, Doe may-have it docketed as a judgment
of the Superior Court without giving notice to anyone. Thereafter, he
may cause an execution to issue and Doe's property to be sold under
the execution without causing any notice to be given to mortgagees or
other judgment creditors except such notice as is required to be given
by the advertisement of sale under execution. Does anyone contend
that the execution sale does not effectively cut off the lien of junior
judgments or of subsequently recorded mortgages, or any liens of lesser
dignity? Why should not the same thing be true of execution sales
under tax judgments, taxes being an annually recurring matter of which
everyone is charged with notice? The docketing and executing a judg-
ment upon ordinary commercial or private transactions are sporadic,
indefinite as to time, and might well catch interested parties by surprise.
But not so with taxes.
Not only is everyone charged with notice that taxes become due
annually and that certain legal procedures are provided for their col-
lection, but any interested party has ample opportunity to inform him-
self as to the amount of any tax lien upon any piece of property in
which he is interested. Section 1705 of the Machinery Act provides:
"All persons who have or may acquire any interest in any property
which may be or may become subject to a lien for taxes are hereby
charged with notice that such property is or should be listed for taxes,
that taxes are or may become a lien thereon, and that if taxes are not
paid such proceedings may be taken against said property as are allowed
by law. Such notice shall be conclusively presumed, whether such per-
sons have actual notice or not."' 7
Section 171118 requires tax collectors to give to any interested party
a statement of taxes due upon any specified piece of real estate upon
request. Section 1715(c) 19 requires the annual sale of the liens of
unpaid taxes to be advertised for four weeks by public posting and
also by newspaper if one is published in the county. This advertise-
ment must carry the name of the person in whose name the property
was listed, a description of the property upon which the tax is a lien,
and the amount of the lien. This advertisement alone affords more
publicity than many procedures available to private parties.
After the tax certificates are sold, the collector must wait at least
six months before he can docket the tax judgment.20 After index-
ing, the judgment must lie at least another six months as a matter of
public record in the clerk of court's office.21 Finally, upon issuance
of execution, the sale must be advertised by posting notice thereof for
thirty days at the courthouse, and also by newspaper advertisement
IT Id. §7971(214).
281 Id. §7971 (220). " Id. §7971(224) (c).
11 Id. §7971(229) (a). " Id. §7971(229) (c).
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once each week for four successive weeks.22 Again, the name of the
person who listed the property and a description of the property must
be set out.
The above would certainly appear to be ample provisions for pub-
licity of an in rem proceeding, especially one that is based upon an
annual, recurring liability, rather than upon an occasional, extraordinary
one arising from torts or contractual obligations not of a periodic
nature.
Finally, Section 1721 provides that no action or proceeding shall be
brought to contest the validity of any title to real property acquired
through any proceeding authorized by the Machinery Act, nor any
motion to reopen or set aside the judgment in any such proceeding be
entertained after one year from the date on which the deed is recorded.
This limitation of one year should further protect a title acquired
through an execution sale.
ANALOGY TO EARLIER PRACTICE
For a good many years the tax laws of the state provided for a
method of selling land for taxes and for conveying such lands to the
purchaser with less requirement for notice than is contained in Section
1720. For example, an early law provided that a purchaser of a tax
sale certificate could apply to the sheriff, after the one-year period for
redemption had expired, and receive a deed to the land.28 There was
no further sale under execution or otherwise, no docketing of the cer-
tificate as a judgment, no further notice or advertising required, as
under Section 1720. Yet, the court sustained such titles as valid against
the whole world. In Powell v. Sikes, which arose under that act, it
was held that the sheriff's deed conveyed good title as against a mort-
gagee whose mortgage was duly recorded before the sale of the certif-
icate, and who had no notice of the sale and consequently no notice
that the grantee was entitled to a deed.
24
Powell v. Sikes, cited Exum v. Baker 2 5 which went even further
in charging interested parties with notice of the lien for taxes and the
possibility of proceedings thereon which might cut off their interests.
A mortgage conveying the land in question was executed in 1875, and
plaintiff claimed under a decree of foreclosure of the mortgage and a
deed executed pursuant to the decree. The land was sold in 1894 for
taxes due for the year 1886 by virtue of a special act which revived
the right to collect the tax after such right had become dormant. 20
Defendant received a deed after the expiration of the period for re-
-2 Id. §687.
1
3 N. C. Pub. Laws 1891, c. 323. 24119 N. C. 231, 26 S. E. 38 (1896).
2r 115 N. C. 242, 20 S. E. 448 (1894).N. C. Pub. Laws 1891, c. 391.
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demption. In discussing the duty of a mortgagee to keep himself in-
formed as to proceedings upon tax liens, the court said at page 243:
"The lien of the tax on the land, if it be a lien at all, as against a
person without notice, is generally superior to the right of either mort-
gagor or mortgagee. Wooten v. Sugg, 114 N. C. 295. Hence it is
ordinarily the duty of the mortgagee, ceriainly on the failure of the
mortgagor to discharge such lien, to avail himself of the privilege given
him by statute (the Code, sec. 3700) and save his security. If the
assignee or mortgagee negligently suffered another to acquire a superior
right by purchasing at a tax sale, he cannot complain of consequences
which naturally followed. If the lien for tax was superior, Jasper
Baker acquired, on the expiration of the time allowed for reaeemption
and the execution of a deed by the tax collector, a better title, legal
and equitable, than that of mortgagor or mortgagee."
The Court even charged the mortgagee with notice that a dormant
tax lien might be revived by the legislature. On page 245 we find the
following:
"The mortgagee was required to see to the discharge of the tax
liens as they fell due, if the mortgagor should make default in the
payment, or submit to the consequences of his neglect to do so. He
is presumed to have known that the tax for 1886 was not paid when
he conveyed to the plaintiff as trustee in 1888, and that it constituted
a lien which it was competent for the Legislature to revive after it
should become dormant."
So we see that in the past our Court has upheld the validity of tax
titles acquired in proceedings more summary in nature than that pro-
vided by Section 1720. While there are some vagaries in the cases,
the main current of opinions which have held tax titles defective have
been based on the ground that the particular procedure prescribed by
the law in effect at the time had not been followed, rather than upon
the ground that certain procedure must be both prescribed and fol-
lowed. The cases have required that procedure provided by law be
followed, but the cases dealing with the early summary procedure do
not support the proposition that the constitutional requirement of due
process means that personal notice must be given to all interested
parties, or even that a formal court action is necessary in order to
divest tiles and interest because of the non-payment of taxes.
A fairly clear-cut case is presented in Stanley v. Baird,27 where
the Court upheld the tax title although patently unsympathetic with
the summary nature of the procedure under which the land was sold,
and although it was clear that a presumption (prior exhaustion by the
sheriff of recourse to the personal property of the taxpayer) made con-
clusive by the statute was contrary to the actual facts of the case.
27 118 N. C. 75, 24 S. E. 12 (1896).
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In that case one Richardson listed the land while he was the owner.
He still owned the land-when the tax list was placed in the hands of the
sheriff for collection, but sold the land to Stanley before the sale of the
tax certificate on April 2, 1894, the deed to Stanley, which was duly
recorded, having been executed on January 2, 1894. Notice of the
certificate sale was given personally and by mail to Richardson, the
former owner, but not to Stanley, and the sale was legally advertised
in the newspaper and by posting notices as required. At the sale, the
county became the purchaser of the land which was valued at $250 for
$5.79, the amount of its lien and costs of sale. After the expiration of
the period of redemption, the county assigned its bid to Baird who, a
few months later and without any notice to Richardson, Stanley or
anyone else and without any further publication, demanded and received
from the sheriff a deed to the property. It was held that Baird took
a good title as against Stanley who had received no notice other than
that given to the general public through the advertisement of the tax
certificate sale. The Court, speaking through Justice Furches, dis-
approved of the extent to which the Legislature had gone in simplifying
tax foreclosure procedure, but approved of its right to do so. On page
81 the Court said:
"From the great difficulty in collecting taxes and in sustaining tax
titles for land, under the law as it existed prior to 1887, it was neces-
sary that there should be legislation on the subject. But in providing
for an admitted defect in the law it may well be considered whether the
legislative pendulum did not swing too far the other way, and whether
the time for redemption should not be extended and the purchaser be
required, at least six months before the expiration of the time at which
he will be entitled to demand a deed, to give the owner of the land
notice of his purchase, the amount paid and the time when he will be
entitled to demand a deed, personally, if the party resides in the State
and is known, and by publication if he does not reside in the State or
is not known to the purchaser. But this is a matter for the Legislature
to -determine, and not for us. It is our duty to declare the law as we
find it, and not to make the law. And, this being so, we find no error
in the judgment appealed from."
Since the procedure under Section 1720 is different from that pro-
vided by earlier statutes, no useful purpose would be served by a fur-
ther discussion of those earlier cases. The purpose of referring to
those earlier cases is to point out that the Court has sustained titles
acquired through procedures with less provisions for notice to interested
parties than is required by Section 1720. When those cases held titles
invalid, it was due to failure to follow the procedure prescribed by the
legislature, not because the procedure itself was constitutionally de-
fective. With respect to such procedures, the Constitution now requires
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no more of such procedures than was required when those earlier stat-
utes were being upheld and given effect by the Court.
The Supreme Court of the United States has held that summary
procedures for the assessment and collection of taxes are valid if at
some stage in the proceeding before the tax demand becomes final and
irrevocable the taxpayer has an opportunity to be heard by a competent
tribunal.28  As heretofore pointed out, the ad valorem taxpayer in
North Carolina is given the opportunity to be heard with respect to the
proposed assessment even before it is made, with the right to appeal
to the courts if not satisfied with the action of the county board of
equalization and the State Board of Assessment. Since a tax scroll
in the hands of the collector is given the force and effect of a judgment,
an assessment made without notice and an opportunity to be heard is
void. To deny that the procedure provided by the Machinery Act for
the assessment of ad valorem taxes does not meet the requirements of
due process would automatically void29 every ad valorem tax levy of
every municipality and county in North Carolina; for, if the procedure
does not provide the essential elements of due process the tax, which is
given the force and effect of a judgment, would be a nullity. That the
essential elements of due process are found in the current listing and
assessing procedure which has been in use in North Carolina for a long
number of years, and that following such procedure results in judg-
ment liens against the property taxed has been held in numerous cases.
It would not appear to subject the Constitution to any undue strain to
permit such judgments to be executed and to give effect to the dignity
of the liens created thereby.
RECENT CASES
In the above discussion of the procedure provided by Section 1720
of the Machinery Act and in making the suggestion that there are no
constitutional prohibitions against a declaration that a title obtained
pursuant to that procedure is good as against other lienors as well as
against the owner, we are not brushing aside or discounting the hold-
ings of those cases which have "held that in an action to foreclose the
lien of taxes, it is necessary to make all persons who have an interest
in the property-holders of junior as well as prior recorded mortgages
and judgments-parties in order to foreclose such interests. In mind
are those cases which started in Orange County in the center of the
State with the holding that only the listing taxpayer and spouse need
" Nickey v. Mississippi, 292 U. S. 393, 54 Sup. Ct. 743, 78 L. ed. 1323 (1934) ;
American Surety Co. v. Baldwin, 287 U. S. 156, 53 Sup. Ct. 98, 77 L. ed. 231
(1932); Phillips v. Com'r of Internal Revenue, 283 U. S. 589, 51 Sup. Ct. 608,
75 L. ed. 1289 (1931).
"' Lumber Co. v. Smith, 146 N. C. 199, 59 S. E. 653 (1907).
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be personally served with process 30 followed by cases from the west3 1
and from the east 2 which added the requirement that all lienholders
of record must be made parties, and culminated in another Orange
County case which set aside a sale under foreclosure at the instance
of a holder of a note secured by a deed of trust who had not been made
a party to the foreclosure suit.
33
Those cases have extended the requirements to the point of practical
impossibility of compliance in some cases. For example, suppose there
is on record a judgment against the taxpayer in favor of a former
domestic corporation that has ceased to do business and has forfeited
its charter more than three years prior to the institution of the tax suit.
The stockbook of the corporation cannot be located. Against whom
must summons be issued? How can an affidavit be drawn that will
support service by publication? Suppose it later turns out that some
of the stockholders are well-known residents of the county? The pro-
gressive extension of requirements introduced by those and other recent
cases, and the successive overturning of prior decisions have contributed
substantially to the popular lack of faith in the validity of any tax title,
entertained alike by lawyers and laymen. Because of that popular lack
of faith there is an urgent need for an affirmance of the validity of
titles acquired through a simple process that can be easily followed and
understood.
Those cases are open to some suspicion that the more stringent
rules laid down therein are in some degree a by-product of the tle-
pression when a natural sympathy for persons whose property is
being foreclosed was somewhat heightened by the prevalence of forced
sales at grossly inadequate prices. For instance, it was mentioned in
the opinion in Buncombe County v. Penland, supra, that property worth
$12,000 had been sold for $413.13, and in Beaufort County v. Mayo,
supra, that property having an assessed tax value of $129,695 brought
$12,959.80-roughly 32 percent and 10 percent respectively, of the
assessed values.
Those recent decisions, however, do not detract from the position
that a title obtained through the summary procedure provided by Sec-
tion 1720 of the Machinery Act is valid, not only as against the tax-
payer but also as against judgment and mortgage lienors. On the
contrary, a careful reading of the cases, their basis and precedents serves
to buttress that position. Those cases are based upon the provision of
the tax law that tax liens may be enforced "by an action in the nature
So Orange County v. Wilson, 202 N. C. 424, 163 S. E. 113 (1932); Orange
County v. Jenkins, 200 N. C. 202, 156 S. E. 774 (1930).
"1Buncombe County v. Penland, 206 N. C. 211, 173 S. E. 609 (1934).
sBeaufort County v. Mayo, 207 N. C. 211, 176 S. E. 753 (1934).
Orange County v. Atkinson, 207 N. C. 593, 178 S. E. 91 (1935).
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of an action to foreclose a mortgage." It is probably unfortunate that
procedure in tax foreclosure actions was referred to the procedure in
mortgage foreclosure cases instead of outlining a procedure especially
provided for taxes. However, at the time the reference to mortgage
forclosure proceedings was first inserted in the tax law, the Court had
been following the rule that in the foreclosure of a superior lien it
was not necessary to make inferior lienors parties in order to divest
their interest in the land; that their liens were transferred from the
land to any surplus realized from the sale. When they were made parties
it was for the purpose of determining their rights to the surplus.
3 4
This rule apparently prevailed until in 1911, in Jones v. Williams,85
the Court held, with Chief Justice Clark dissenting on the ground that
the majority opinion was changing the settled law on the subject, that a
decree of foreclosure does not bind a junior lienor who was not made a
party to the action, and that the right of such junior lienor to redeem
was not affected. Guy v. Harmon,26 which stated: "Foreclosure is "an
equitable proceeding and the law as interpreted and applied in this
State, has uniformly commanded a day in court for parties in interest,"
cites Jones v. Williams as its authority on this point. The same case
is the authority for the decisions in Beaufort County v. Mayo, supra,
and Buncombe County v. Penland, supra.
DISTINCTION RECOGNIZED IN JONES V. WILLIAMS
The majority opinion in Jones z. Williams drew a clear distinction
between sales held under contractual or statutory powers and those
held pursuant to an equitable proceeding in a court. The distinction
is pertinent to this discussion and important; for without it a large
number of procedures in daily use which lawyer and layman alike
accept without question would be rendered useless, and titles which are
acquired every day through such procedures would be of such doubtful
validity or the procedures would have to become burdened with such
expense and delays through elaborations as to virtually deprive many
claimants of their rights. The purpose of such procedures as the law
provides for the execution of judgments, the foreclosure of mortgages
and deeds of trust under powers of sale, the enforcement of liens given
to materialmen, artisans, laborers, warehousemen and others, and other
procedures which will readily come to the lawyer's mind would be
largely defeated. Said the Court:
"There is no analogy between this case and those where sales are made
under a power contained in a mortgage or deed of trust, or under an
execution issued upon a judgment, for in the former case when the
s, Gammon v. Johnson, 126 N. C. 64, 35 S. E. 185 (1900).
"155 N. C. 179, 71 S. E. 222 (1911).30 204 N. C. 226, 227, 167 S. E. 796, 797 (1933).
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party acts under a power he is proceeding out of court, and in the case
of an execution he is proceeding under a statutory power or mandate,
and the court is not called upon to exercise its equitable jurisdiction and
do what is manifest justice as between all parties interested. The plain-
tiff is merely enforcing a right acquired at law by legal process and that
is all. In such cases, third parties must be vigilant and take care of
their interests." (Italics ours.)7
It is inescapable that the -distinction thus drawn is necessary and
valid, and is directly applicable to tax procedures. There- is no more
reason why there should be, with respect to mortgages than there is
with respect to taxes, two different procedures for foreclosures, one
with and one without the necessity of a court action, but either of
which will vest in the purchaser a clear title if whichever procedure is
used is properly followed. The tax foreclosure procedure provided by
Section 1720 of the Machinery Act is that of an execution upon a judg-
ment. It is a proceeding under a statutory power or mandate, and
while there are also provided two other procedures in the nature of an
action to foreclose a m6rtgage, the Supreme Court held valid a more
summary procedure than that provided by Section 1720 when such a
procedure was on the statute books, a few pages removed from C. S.
7990, at an earlier date. The law of those earlier cases remained good
through the years and has not been changed by the recent cases dealing
with foreclosures by court action. The legislature merely suspended
the statutory power for a few years, but in 1939 reinstated it in a
slightly different and more elaborate form.
The distinction drawn in Jones v. Williams, supra, is strongly
pointed up by two opinions which were filed by the Supreme Court of
North Carolina on January 28, 1935, and reported in the same volume
with only one case intervening. Neither opinion referred to the other,
which is significant of the fact that the distinction is so well recognized
that the necessity of differentiating between foreclosures by court actions
and those under powers of sale apparently did not occur to the Court.
In one opinion38 the Court allowed a motion to set aside a sale under
a decree of foreclosure at the instance of a holder of a note secured by a
deed of trust on the premises. In the other opinion 9 the Court held
that a foreclosure sale under a power was valid although the mortgagor
received no notice of the sale, and apparently the mortgagor's name
was not mentioned in connection with the advertisement of the sale.
CONCLUSION
A study of the early cases upholding earlier statutory authority for
summary tax foreclosure procedures, the comparison of the procedure
" 155 N. C. 179, 193, 71 S. E. 222, 228 (1911).
", Orange County v. Atkinson, 207 N. C. 593, 178 S. E. 91 (1935).
"9 Biggs v. Oxendine, 207 N. C. 601, 178 S. E. 216 (1935).
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outlined in Section 1720 of the Machinery Act, with other summary
remedies universally acknowledged to be valid, a consideration of the
cases dealing with titles transmitted through the use of such remedies,
and the recognition by the Court of the distinction between equitable
court proceedings and those under statutory powers or mandates with
respect to the transfer of titles free and clear of incumbrances, leads
us to the conclusion that there is nothing in the Constitution of North
Carolina, nothing in our statutes, and nothing* in our court decisions
which militates against the view that the procedure provided by Section
1720 of the Machinery Act of 1939, if properly followed, will vest in.
the purchaser a clear title to the premises involved.
It is suggested that a return to a simpler method of tax foreclosure
would save the municipalities and counties of North Carolina, that is to
say, the taxpayers, many thousands of dollars in costs and expenses paid
out annually in court actions, many more thousands of dollars- involved
in tax liens too small individually to justify promptly putting the ex-
pensive court machinery in motion, and many other thousands of dol-
lars tied up in foreclosed real estate for which purchasers can be found
only at grossly inadequate prices because of doubts as to the validity
of the title. It is further suggested that the use of the method provided
by Section 1720, a procedure which the tax attorney can easily and
therefore more surely follow, against which the title examiner can
easily check without having to constantly refer to a mass of somewhat
conflicting cases, and which the average businessman can learn to
understand since it approximates his own methods and is removed from
the realm of what he regards as legal mysticism or hocus pocus, would
go a long way toward restoring the marketability of tax titles. And
that would be no mean service to the cities, towns and counties of
North Carolina.
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